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“Can They Do That?”: Why Religious Parents and 
Communities May Fear the Future Regarding State 
Interests and Custodial Law 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“To rip up hundreds of parents and children and put them in a 
makeshift prison while you investigate to see if they did anything 
wrong is un-American,” according to attorney Dick DeGuerin.1 
“You shouldn’t be allowed to search a whole village on the basis of a 
phone call[,] and not only search the area where there might be 
evidence but search every residence in the village[.] That’s never 
happened in American jurisprudence,” stated Tucson attorney Mike 
Piccarreta.2 These comments referenced the State of Texas’s April 
2008 actions toward the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints (“FLDS”), where Texas law enforcement officers 
and the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services 
(“DFPS”) raided the FLDS’s Yearning for Zion Ranch (“YFZ 
Ranch”) location in search of an allegedly sexually abused 16-year-
old female.3 Although the supposed victim was never found, Texas 
officials eventually took 468 children4 from the YFZ Ranch, allegedly 
because of an “immediate” and “urgent” need for removal5 based 
upon the community’s common belief system and living style.  
 
 1. William M. Welch, Papers Detail Alleged Abuse at Sect’s Compound, USA TODAY 
(Apr. 9, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-04-08-polygamy_N.htm 
(quoting Dick DeGuerin because of his past experience with private religious communities, 
including negotiating on behalf of David Koresh with federal authorities during the Branch 
Davidian standoff in Waco, Texas). 
 2. Guy Murray, Texas Authorities Release FLDS Raid Affidavit, MESSENGER AND 
ADVOCATE (Apr. 9, 2008, 6:37 AM), http://messengerandadvocate.wordpress.com/ 
2008/04/09/texas-authorities-release-flds-raid-affidavit/ (Mike Piccarreta’s interview with 
Arizona media outlet KVOA). 
 3. Timeline of Raid on FLDS-Owned YFZ Ranch, DESERET NEWS (May 23, 2008), 
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700228439/ [hereinafter Timeline].  
 4. Jessica Dixon Weaver, The Texas Mis-Step: Why the Largest Child Removal in Modern 
U.S. History Failed, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 449, 452 (2010). 
 5. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(b)(1)–(3) (West 2010) (setting forth Texas’ 
statutory requirements regarding child removal, including urgent and immediate need for 
removal when the child’s health or safety is in danger). 
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DFPS’s invasion of the YFZ Ranch community constituted an 
almost unprecedented child removal operation. Although past 
attempts against similar communities have occurred,6 this focus on 
child removal apart from polygamy7 was unique and may cause 
parental concern regarding state removal and termination actions 
within a religious context.8 
Undoubtedly, physical, sexual, and psychological child abuse 
constitute deplorable activities, and suspected occurrences should be 
investigated and potentially prosecuted.9 A child found within that 
situation should be assisted and provided protection (within 
constitutional statutory guidelines).10 However, are state actions 
toward protecting children from potential abuse (as happened at 
YFZ Ranch) justified in an immediate removal of virtually all 
children living within a religious community upon the basis that the 
potential practice of the community’s “pervasive belief system” 
perpetuates an abusive situation and can be imputed to every parent 
within the community?11  
 
 6. See, e.g., MARTHA SONNTAG BRADLEY, KIDNAPPED FROM THAT LAND: THE 
GOVERNMENT RAIDS ON THE SHORT CREEK POLYGAMISTS 48–96 (1993) (describing 
significant government action in arresting polygamous individuals and taking over 200 children 
into state custody); BRIAN C. HALES, MODERN POLYGAMY AND MORMON 
FUNDAMENTALISM: THE GENERATIONS AFTER THE MANIFESTO 272–73, 309–18 (2006) 
(discussing 1953 Arizona state action to arrest Mormon fundamentalists living in polygamous 
relationships within Short Creek, Arizona); see also Ken Driggs, “This Will Someday Be the Head 
and Not the Tail of the Church”: A History of the Mormon Fundamentalists at Short Creek, 43 J. 
CHURCH & ST. 49 (2001) (describing the establishment of Short Creek, Arizona by 
polygamous families). 
 7. Weaver, supra note 4, at 534 (“Texas did not enter the YFZ Ranch with the express 
intent of arresting all the adults for the crime of polygamy as Arizona did in 1953 . . . .”). 
 8. Although this Comment could look at removal standards based solely on 
polygamous behavior, it instead will focus on removal standards relating to religion in general. 
 9. See, e.g., Tara Dodrill, Texas Polygamy Case Should Spur Changes in Child Removal 
Across the Nation, ASSOCIATED CONTENT (June 27, 2008), http://tinyurl.com/78dxg26 (“If 
even one child suffers as a result [of sexual or physical abuse], then by all means . . . remove the 
young person from the abusive household environment.”). 
 10. Out of fear of being misunderstood, I would like to repeat for emphasis: Removal 
and termination actions by accountable agencies (utilizing unambiguous statutory procedures 
and guidelines) can be applauded where truly warranted by actual sexual, mental, or physical 
abuse. This Comment is only intended to explore the possibility of unjust removal actions 
involving religious parents and what possible recourse they may have. It is not intended to 
justify perpetrators of sorrow who hurt the most vulnerable and precious members of our 
society. 
 11. Weaver, supra note 4, at 452. Another problematic element that could be 
considered is the unsubstantiated phone call supposedly warranting the initial invasion and  
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Other religious parents and communities may be understandably 
concerned with the potential for similar governmental actions and 
accompanying justifications focused on religious belief. These 
parents and communities may wonder how DFPS actions comport 
with typical child removal and termination standards, and how these 
standards apply in a religious context.12 There may be legitimate fear 
that child removal and termination of parental rights could occur 
based on specific religious beliefs seen as “pervasive” throughout a 
religious community.13 This fear may escalate if a religious 
community’s pervasive beliefs could be assumed as belonging to 
every parent within the community, thus implying that each parent 
will practice every tenant of those beliefs, especially if this created an 
immediate and urgent need for child removal in the eyes of the State. 
In other words, can a child be removed, and parental rights 
terminated, for religious reasons? 
This Comment explores child removal and parental right 
termination standards in order to determine whether either action 
can overtly or covertly occur under a religious pretext, and what 
potential protections religious parents and communities would have 
in such a situation. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that, 
although DFPS’s actions at the YFZ Ranch could cause alarm for 
religious parents and communities, parents’ religious beliefs and 
actions concerning their children likely will not warrant removal 
and/or termination absent a clear and convincing showing that the 
 
serving as the catalyst of the removal process for minors not involved with the call or its 
contents. 
 12. There are additional, relevant questions unaddressed by this Comment regarding 
child removal based on a parent’s religious beliefs impacting the child, each of which would 
alter the analysis. These include whether state action is influenced depending on the religious 
community involved, the sect’s popularity level, or the context of doctrinal application (e.g., 
blood transfusions, vaccinations, home schooling, corporal punishment, etc). See, e.g., Jennifer 
E. Chen, Family Conflicts: The Role of Religion in Refusing Medical Treatment for Minors, 58 
HASTINGS L.J. 643 (2007) (exploring the intersection between interests and rights involved in 
a religious parent refusing medical treatment for their child); Howard Friedman, Church 
Leaders, Parents Charged with Child Abuse in “Biblical Punishment” of Their Children, 
RELIGION CLAUSE (Mar. 23, 2011, 7:10 AM), http://religionclause.blogspot.com/ 
2011/03/church-leaders-parents-charged-with.html (discussing parents in a Wisconsin church 
being charged with abusing their children for using rods to spank them out of a religious belief 
in punishment). 
 13. Weaver, supra note 4, at 500–01 (discussing the State’s expert witness’s comments 
regarding the FLDS belief system’s troubling aspects including emphasis on beliefs of 
obedience, faith, honoring God, and eternal reward). 
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effect of such belief causes significant abuse.14 Therefore, judicial and 
legislative protections are in place to determine whether removal and 
termination can occur under perceived arbitrary state action within a 
religious context.15 However, despite these protections, religious 
parents may maintain some apprehension because removal and 
termination actions for religious reasons could potentially still be 
justified under broad statutory definitions and judicial interpretations 
based on potential subjectivity often inherent in terms such as 
“abuse,” “social good,” “welfare,” and “aggravated 
circumstances.”16 To protect from this potential subjectivity, relevant 
child welfare statutes should be enhanced with specific definitions for 
prospectively ambiguous terminology regarding state removal 
actions.  
Part II of this Comment details the history, facts, and 
motivations behind DFPS’s raid of the YFZ Ranch, delineating three 
general justifications used for removal and the inferences creating 
potential fear in religious parents and communities. Part III provides 
an analytical framework for discussing removal in the religious 
context by briefly describing general legal standards for child 
removal, termination of parental rights, and judicial tensions 
between constitutionally protected parental rights and state interests 
in protecting children. It also briefly addresses the potentially 
irreversible damage that results to children when unjustifiably 
removed from parental care. Part IV discusses the role of religion in 
the removal and termination process, arguing that usually religion 
only becomes a factor in removal proceedings when the belief system 
directly results in actual child mistreatment. In addition, it outlines 
potential protections religious parents receive from judicial review of 
removal actions for statutory compliance, as demonstrated by the 
court system’s ultimate rejection of DFPS’s mass removal action. 
Part V summarizes dangerous inferences that could be made based 
on DFPS’s removal reasoning and the legal protections religious 
parents may receive in such circumstances. It concludes by exploring 
the potential dangers of judicial activism and statutory ambiguity if 
removal becomes a pretext for religious hostility. 
  
 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part III. These protections include (but ultimately are not limited to) due 
process concerns, high evidentiary standards, strictly construed statutory requirements, etc. 
 16. See infra Part IV and Part V. 
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II. “DEEP IN THE HEART OF TEXAS”: RESCUE FROM A RELIGIOUS 
COMMUNITY 
The FLDS church initially purchased the 1700-acre YFZ Ranch 
in 2004 and renovated it into a relatively small community, including 
“orchards, gardens, a school, dairy,”17 a temple, a 29,000-square-
foot house for their “prophet,”18 and “multi-story residential 
household complexes.”19 DFPS’s initial investigation of the YFZ 
Ranch was prompted by several phone calls received from an 
allegedly 16-year-old female20 currently living within the 
community.21 On March 29–30, 2008, this supposed teenaged 
mother telephoned a local family shelter multiple times expressing a 
desire to leave “her current living situation.”22 The individual 
declared her involvement in a plural “spiritual marriage” at the age 
of 15 with an adult male over thirty years her senior,23 resulting in 
her having given birth to one child and being pregnant with a 
second child.24 The caller described the abusive situation she lived 
under at the ranch, including that she had been beaten, choked, 
sexually abused, and kept against her will.25 
Because accusations of child sexual abuse are considered a 
“priority one” situation, DFPS and police responded within twenty-
four hours in a joint investigation.26 Based on these telephone calls, 
 
 17. Nancy Perkins, FLDS Struggle Beyond YFZ Ranch Borders, DESERET NEWS (Aug. 
25, 2008, 12:15 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700253581/FLDS-struggle-
beyond-YFZ-Ranch-borders.html. 
 18. Thomas Korosec, West Texas Polygamist Compound Worries Some, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE (Mar. 6, 2005, 6:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ 
metropolitan/3069543.html. 
 19. Aff. in Supp. of Original Pet. for Protection of a Child in an Emergency and for 
Conservatorship in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship at 2 (51st Dist. Ct. Schleicher 
County, Tex. Apr. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Affidavit]. 
 20. Don Teague, Polygamist “Girls” Surprise Investigators, MSNBC.COM (May 21, 
2008, 6:33 PM), http://fieldnotes.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2008/05/21/4377396-
polygamist-girls-surprise-investigators (noting that the caller was considered a real person in 
the investigation up until May 18, 2008, at which point authorities acknowledged she did not 
exist and began investigating the hoax calls as potentially being made by a Colorado adult 
“with a history of making false reports”). 
 21. Affidavit, supra note 19, at 2–4. 
 22. Id. at 3. 
 23. Timeline, supra note 3; see also Affidavit, supra note 19, at 3. 
 24. Affidavit, supra note 19, at 2–3. 
 25. Id. at 3. 
 26. Weaver, supra note 4, at 459–60 (describing the procedures and statutes 
authorizing combined agency and state police action in child abuse situations). 
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DFPS obtained orders and authorization to investigate the YFZ 
Ranch concerning these child abuse allegations, including 
interviewing and transporting children from the ranch.27 On April 3, 
2008, Texas law enforcement officers and DFPS officials entered the 
FLDS’s YFZ Ranch in search of the 16-year-old female caller.28 
While searching for and interviewing individuals possibly connected 
to the caller, investigators observed numerous “young” girls who 
“appeared to be” pregnant minors or minors who had already given 
birth.29 
In addition, DFPS purportedly discovered patterns potentially 
placing children at the YFZ Ranch at risk of “emotional, physical 
and/or sexual abuse.”30 FLDS practices allegedly placing the 
children in immediate danger included the determination that minor 
female children were indoctrinated and groomed “to accept spiritual 
marriages” and sexual relationships with adult men after reaching 
“child bearing age.”31 In addition, “minor boys” were allegedly 
taught to become “sexual[] perpetrators” by entering spiritual 
marriages and sexual relationships with minor females after reaching 
adulthood.32 
Because of perceived neglect, sexual abuse, and immediate 
danger to the children’s health and safety, DFPS determined that 
continued residence at the YFZ Ranch was contrary to the welfare of 
all female and male minors currently residing there.33 Eventually, 
468 children were taken from the location and placed into Texas’s 
“temporary managing conservatorship.”34 DFPS justified broad-
reaching removal of virtually every child at the location because it 
viewed the YFZ community as constituting “one household” with a 
common, “pervasive belief system” condoning underage marriage 
 
 27. Affidavit, supra note 19, at 4. 
 28. Timeline, supra note 3. 
 29. Affidavit, supra note 19, at 5. See Murray, supra note 2 (suggesting problems 
regarding agency action based on the “appearance” of pregnant minors without factual 
verification; however, this problem is partially created by the community’s avoidance of 
answering agency questions about age, family status, etc.). 
 30. Affidavit, supra note 19, at 5. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.; cf. Teague, supra note 20 (noting that DFPS’s actions occurred despite its 
eventual acknowledgment that the original caller/victim did not actually exist). 
 34. Weaver, supra note 4, at 452. 
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and sexual activity.35 According to DFPS, the FLDS belief system 
(combined with finding, during its investigation, five minor females 
who became pregnant between age fifteen and sixteen) created a 
danger warranting urgent protection and immediate removal of all 
children from their parents and homes.36  
Therefore, according to DFPS, the YFZ Ranch community’s 
assumed belief structure evidenced an immediate need for removal of 
any endangered children, and these beliefs could be inferred as 
applying to every person currently living within the community.37 As 
stated by DFPS’s lead investigator, “living under an umbrella of 
belief that having children at a young age is a blessing” created an 
environment where no child would be considered safe.38 This broad-
sweeping removal action was taken despite a lack of evidence (as 
acknowledged by DPFS) indicating that any prepubescent males or 
females were victims, or in danger of being victims, of actual physical 
or sexual abuse.39 
At first glance, many observers felt DFPS’s actions were 
warranted and well-justified.40 However, as time progressed and 
media attention proliferated, questions arose regarding the agency’s 
process and justifications for such seemingly broad actions.41 A 
second look at the situation uncovered a potentially disturbing 
realization: a mass child removal action had occurred because of a 
religious community’s tight-knit culture and commonly held beliefs. 
 
 35. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *1, *2–3 (Tex. App. 
May 22, 2008); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.107(b), 201(d) (West 2010) (indicating 
a court may consider whether a household includes a person who has “sexually abused another 
child” in determining whether there is continuing danger to the child’s physical health or 
safety). 
 36. Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3.  
 37. Affidavit, supra note 19, at 5. (“Based on the [investigation, DFPS] determined that 
an immediate danger exists to the physical health or safety of the children who are residents of 
the YFZ Ranch . . . and that their continuing [residence on the Ranch] would be contrary to 
the children’s welfare.”). 
 38. Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3 n.8. 
 39. Id. at *2. 
 40. See, e.g., Trouble in the Hills, THE DAILY BEAST (Apr. 9, 2008, 8:00 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/2008/04/09/trouble-in-the-hills.html (quoting the Eldorado 
First Baptist Church Pastor as saying the raid would enable numerous people to have a better 
life, and that the raid was “worth it” even if only “one person could be salvaged from child 
abuse”). 
 41. Weaver, supra note 4, at 489 & n.359 (explaining that many media members posed 
the question of whether “this case [was] more about the disapproval of a particular religion or 
the alleged abuse of children”). 
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This common belief system, and ascription of the term “family” to a 
community of believers, supposedly warranted taking every parent’s 
child within the community without regard as to whether or not 
those particular children were actually at risk.42 This reasoning and 
quick assertion of agency power chilled some observers who 
reasoned by analogy that if broad child removal could occur in this 
situation, then it could potentially occur in a number of other 
situations involving theological beliefs within similar religious 
communities.43 
Thus, the YFZ Ranch case demonstrates potential for a child 
removal action to hinge on a determination that: 1) a church’s 
“pervasive belief system” can perpetuate an abusive situation through 
the potential future practice of the belief, 2) a community of 
believers can be considered the same as a “family unit” and thus the 
“pervasive belief system” can be inferred to be held by every member 
of the religious community, and 3) a belief system can necessitate the 
urgent need for immediate removal of minor children from their 
parents.44 
III. JUDICIAL TENSIONS AND LEGAL STANDARDS FOR REMOVAL 
ACTIONS 
A. Parental Rights to Raise v. State’s Right to Intervene 
The YFZ Ranch situation involves constitutionally important 
(albeit judicially uncommon) competing interests and a philosophical 
clash between a parent’s fundamental right to raise his or her 
 
 42. Id. at 494–95. 
 43. See, e.g., Jeff Lindsay, Don’t Mess With the Reich of Texas: The Abuse of Children by 
the State, MORMANITY (Apr. 15, 2008, 8:32 PM), http://mormanity.blogspot.com/ 
2008/04/dont-mess-with-reich-of-texas-abuse-of.html (acknowledging, in blog post and 
comments, troubling aspects within FLDS culture, but questioning the dangerous precedent of 
such a “heavy-handed community-wide” action potentially justifying child removal for other 
religious groups considered “strange”); see also Lee Benson, Texas Raid Violating U.S. Rights, 
DESERET NEWS, (Apr. 9, 2008, 1:04 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/ 
695268584/Texas-raid-violating-US-rights.html (expressing astonishment that such an 
occurrence happened in 21st century America, while generating minimal, general outrage); 
Janet, Tabs on Texas, FEMINIST MORMON HOUSEWIVES (Apr. 15, 2008), 
http://www.feministmormonhousewives.org/?p=1747 (“To a frightening degree, we’re 
caught in a large scale ‘he said, she said’ debate between competing cultures.”). 
 44. Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2. An additional issue left for future exploration 
concerns how an unsubstantiated phone call can warrant investigation and removal if the 
situation “appears” harmful. 
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children and the state’s interest in the societal impact of a child’s 
welfare and upbringing.45 
1. The federal level 
The Supreme Court has spoken on these issues in several 
landmark cases, which help to outline the adversarial nature of this 
topic and define the “playing field” for state removals and 
terminations. These cases are significant because recognition of 
parental rights as “fundamental” ensures due process protection of 
such rights before they can be abridged by government action.46 
Child removal heavily involves a parent’s substantive due process 
rights.47 Even in strained relationships, the Court has declared that 
individuals facing “dissolution of their parental rights” possess a 
critical need for “fundamentally fair procedures.”48 Although the 
YFZ Ranch case never escalated to the level of having to examine 
removal in light of Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns, 
the Supreme Court’s previous rulings declare that religious parents 
receive due process (and, to a degree, First Amendment49) protection 
of the right to raise their children with particular religious beliefs 
without worrying that those beliefs may be arbitrarily adjudicated as 
abusive and deserving of termination. 
First, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court held that parents have 
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights pertaining to the 
upbringing of their children.50 The Court specifically stated that 
 
 45. Brittany Nilson, Note, Yearning for Zion Ranch Raid: Lowering the Standard of 
Proof for the Termination of Parental Rights, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 305, 307 (2009). 
 46. See Rebecca Bonagura, Redefining the Baseline: Reasonable Efforts, Family 
Preservation, and Parenting Foster Children in New York, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 175, 
210–12 (2008); Nilson, supra note 45, at 310. But see James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and 
Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1427, 
1447 (1994) (arguing that courts should recognize the “illegitimacy of the parents’ rights 
doctrine” because parent rights generally trump state intervention “simply because there is a 
long tradition of letting parents do what they want . . . absent a threat of grievous harm”). 
 47. Bonagura, supra note 46, at 211 (stating that a parent’s substantive due process 
rights are implicated in removal action because of parental rights and interests in the 
companionship and custody of their child). 
 48. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982). 
 49. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234–36 (1972) (holding that both the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the State from forcing Amish parents to send their 
children to high school). 
 50. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) 
(asserting that the right to raise one’s children is a civil right “far more precious . . . than 
property rights”); Nilson, supra note 46, at 308–09. 
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“[w]ithout doubt,” liberty denotes freedom to establish a home and 
raise children.51 As such, state interests are balanced against 
fundamental rights of personal liberty (including parental rights).52 
The Court also acknowledged a parent’s due process right in Troxel 
v. Granville.53 Although a plurality decision, Troxel fell in line with 
case law determining that parents have a constitutional right to raise, 
nurture, and educate their children without undue state influence.54 
The Troxel plurality opinion concludes that the State is not justified 
in questioning a “fit” parent’s ability to make decisions concerning 
the rearing of his or her children.55 
Additionally, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court held that a 
statute regulating parents’ educational choices for their children 
unreasonably interfered with parents’ liberty to direct their children’s 
upbringing.56 The Court pontificated that a child was “not the mere 
creature of the state”; instead, nurturers (and those directing the 
child’s destiny) possess the right and duty to prepare the child for 
life’s obligations.57 
Federal circuit courts have also consistently upheld parents’ 
fundamental due process rights where child custody is involved. The 
First Circuit notes that this liberty interest is protected by the Due 
Process Clause’s substantive and procedural aspects guaranteeing 
“fair process” and constraining governmental interference.58 
Regarding child removal actions lacking parental consent and judicial 
authorization, the Second Circuit held that a mother’s parental 




 51. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
 52. Id. at 399–400 (“[L]iberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of 
protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable 
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect.”). 
 53. 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 54. Id. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (declaring that the Court has perpetually 
considered Pierce and Meyer to include a Fourteenth Amendment right for parents to care for 
and nurture their child “free from state intervention”); see, e.g., id. at 67 (plurality opinion). 
 55. Id. at 68–69 (plurality opinion). 
 56. 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
 57. Id. at 535. 
 58. Suboh v. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 91 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)); see also Hatch v. Dep’t for Children, 
Youth & Their Families, 274 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2001). 
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and an opportunity to be heard.”59 Moreover, the Third,60 Fourth,61 
and Sixth62 Circuits have held similarly.  
However, the Supreme Court has held that fundamental liberties 
associated with parenthood can be limited in proportion to 
significant state interests. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court 
outlined the “no man’s land” between parental and state conflict 
over child control, which takes on extraserious implications when 
religious conviction enters the equation.63 The Court held “the 
family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against 
a claim of religious liberty . . . [or] rights of parenthood.”64 The 
Court, previous to Prince, suggested potential areas of exemption 
from absolute free exercise rights because of secular society’s specific 
needs and interests; these include “the protection of the family, the 
promotion of health, the common defense, [and] the raising of 
public revenues to defray the cost of government.”65 
In Prince, the Court determined that the state, as parens 
patriae,66 may restrict parental control, freedom, and authority 
regarding issues affecting a child’s welfare, including matters where a 
parent asserts authority “to control the child’s course of conduct on 
religion or conscience.”67 The Court reasoned that state intervention 
can be justified because the entire community has an interest in 
safeguarding children from abuses and giving them “opportunities 
for growth.”68 In concluding the Prince opinion, the Court 
attempted to leave the parental liberty and state intervention 
battlefield untouched by declaring the Prince ruling as not extending 
 
 59. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825–26 (2d Cir. 1977).  
 60. Croft v. Westmoreland Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (stating that parents have a “constitutionally protected” liberty interest in the 
custody and care of their children). 
 61. Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 342 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that 
state removal of a child triggers Fourteenth Amendment procedural protection). 
 62. Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 941 (6th Cir. 1985) (“It is well-settled that parents 
have a liberty interest in the custody of their children.”). 
 63. 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944). 
 64. Id. at 166. 
 65. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596 (1940). 
 66. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009) (defining parens patriae as “the 
state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves”). 
 67. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. 
 68. Id. at 165. This view is based on the belief that a democratic society’s continuance 
rests “upon the healthy, well-grounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, 
with all that implies.” Id. at 168. 
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beyond its facts.69 The Court readily declared its holding as neither 
laying a foundation for state intervention in a child’s religious 
indoctrination and participation under the guise of “health and 
welfare,” nor giving state justification for limitations on a child’s 
religious activities and training.70 
Thus, tension between parental rights and significant state 
interests continues to be determined on an almost case-by-case 
basis.71 This determination is subject to individual states’ statutory 
guidelines and judicial proceedings regarding removal and 
termination in light of constitutional due process considerations.72 
Although the inherent tension between these two legal doctrines 
may reside within a nebulous middle ground dependent on multiple 
variables, federal courts generally give due process rights serious 
consideration.73 Therefore, religious parents will be provided 
Fourteenth Amendment due process protection at the federal level 
when unjust removal proceedings occur. 
2. The state level 
States also provide statutory and judicial due process defenses for 
parents and for individual children. For example, as pertaining to the 
YFZ Ranch situation, Texas’s Family Code requires “a full adversary 
hearing” be held within fourteen days after a government agency 
removes a child.74 The statute also refers to “child” in the singular 
when laying out guidelines for immediate removal, judicial hearings, 
and potential return.75 Accordingly, the State is required to provide 
due process for each particular child when abuse allegations arise.76 
Thus the State “cannot lump sexual abuse, or risk of sexual abuse, on 
all” children living within a household or a community (regardless of 
how the term household may be defined by that particular state) 
 
 69. Id. at 171. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Weaver, supra note 4, at 535 (arguing that the current state of the law leaves 
state courts with unresolved questions regarding weighing physical and mental harm to 
children and the state’s power to intervene against a parent’s religious rights). 
 72. See id.; infra Part III.A.2. 
 73. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972) (declaring that due process 
protections reflect the high value, embedded in constitutional history, which society places on 
a person’s rights). 
 74. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(a) (West 2010). 
 75. Id. § 262.201(b). 
 76. See id. § 262.201(b)(2); Weaver, supra note 4, at 497. 
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without “sufficient evidence.”77 The Texas Court of Appeals 
regarded this portion of the Texas Family Code as being in place 
particularly to “afford parents the opportunity to challenge [an 
agency’s] right to retain any children whom [the agency] has taken 
into custody under an ex parte order from the court.”78 
However, a potential obstacle preventing due process principles 
from protecting religious parents, as demonstrated in the YFZ Ranch 
scenario, derives from whether the parent will be viewed as separate 
from the community to which they belong. Arguably, “parents” (in 
the traditional sense) did not exist at the YFZ Ranch because DFPS 
viewed them as being controlled by the larger community, and thus 
DFPS imputed to each individual all aspects of the community’s 
collective theological system and doctrinal actions.79 This became a 
major problem during the hearing required by Texas state law to be 
within fourteen days of the action.80 Because of the sheer number of 
children, and the predominate view that the YFZ Ranch constituted 
one household, the initial due process hearing took place en masse81 
on behalf of all the children involved. The majority of the attorney 
ad litems (AAL) were of the opinion the State had not carried its 
burden.82 Many of these AALs (representing children who wanted to 
return to their parents)83 expressed frustration that each child was 
not getting an individual hearing.84 When time came for limited 
questioning, each age group was given a representative to ask 
questions on behalf of all AALs representing children within that 
group.85 
Another potential obstruction of due process protection for 
religious parents arises within state juvenile courts, where 
opportunities to challenge custody orders can be ignored or delayed. 
 
 77. Weaver, supra note 4, at 497 (quoting FAM. § 262.201(b)). 
 78. In re E.D.L., 105 S.W.3d 679, 688 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003). 
 79. See Weaver, supra note 4, at 495 (detailing CPS supervisor Angie Voss’s explanation 
that her concern for every child in the community derived from ranch residents telling her that 
they were all part of “one big family and that they all share[d] the same belief system”). 
 80. FAM. § 262.201(a). 
 81. See Weaver, supra note 4, at 478 (noting that each child did not receive an 
individual hearing). 
 82. See id. at 477–78. 
 83. Id. at 477. 
 84. Id. at 478. 
 85. Id. (detailing how Judge Walther allowed the representative AALs “just ‘a few 
questions’ of the witnesses”) (citation omitted).  
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In Pamela B. v. Ment, a group of concerned parents of children who 
“had been or might be seized by the state department of children 
and families” brought an action against state administrators.86 The 
group was seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief 
regarding temporary state child custody hearings.87 The court’s 
opinion detailed serious allegations of due process violations against 
the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters in Hartford, including the 
practice of commonly holding “continuing orders of temporary 
custody for . . . up to several months, without requiring or 
permitting testimony and based solely upon hearsay statements 
contained in affidavits and other documents.”88 The state supreme 
court eventually held it as “imperative that parents be given a prompt 
and meaningful opportunity to challenge an order of temporary 
custody.”89 
In addition, juvenile courts are often permitted to ignore the 
constitutional rights of “nonoffending parents.”90 These purportedly 
“unfit,” nonoffending parents are defined as individuals the State has 
not made allegations against, who have not violated any statutory 
requirement, and whose only wrong appears to be having “a child in 
common with a parent who allegedly abused or neglected [a] 
child.”91 These considerations could come into play in situations like 
YFZ Ranch where parental roles morph into the “household-as-the-
community” view,92 or in situations where only one parent adheres 
to the beliefs of the community. Consequently, due process 
protections are available at the state level, but may be difficult to 
realistically achieve within every local agency and court system. 
B. Removal and Termination Standards 
Actual child removal and termination of parental rights 
constitute the most extreme measure used to protect state interests 
 
 86. 709 A.2d 1089, 1093 (Conn. 1998). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1095. 
 89. Id. at 1100. 
 90. Vivek S. Sankaran, Parens Patriae Run Amuck: The Child Welfare System’s Disregard 
for the Constitutional Rights of Nonoffending Parents, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 55 (2009) 
(discussing how non-offending parents are often deprived of parental rights based solely on 
admissions of child maltreatment from the other parent). 
 91. Id. at 57. 
 92.  See supra note 78 and its accompanying text. 
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and a child’s welfare.93 Courts usually decline to terminate parental 
rights “unless rehabilitation of the parent is hopeless.”94 Grounds for 
child removal and parental right termination vary among state 
statutes,95 but normally a combination of abuse, neglect, 
abandonment, drug or alcohol dependency, or parental failure to 
abide by a state proscribed treatment plan for child return may 
warrant state intervention.96 Each state has separate procedures for 
categorizing a child as being neglected or abused and for 
categorizing a parent as dependent.97 These statutory standards can 
serve as tools for state removal actions to preserve or restore a child’s 
safety, health, or well-being.98 
In general, states follow a two-step process to determine whether 
a situation requires intervention.99 This process consists of an agency 
finding statutory justification for removal.100 The first step is 
accomplished through a court hearing to establish whether the child 
falls within that particular state’s statutory definitions of abuse, 
neglect, dependency, or other elements requiring state involvement. 
This is followed by step two: a dispositional hearing “to determine 
whether the child should remain with the parent.”101 If these two 
steps affirm that intervention is necessary and requires removal of the 
child from the home, the next phase involves an agency establishing a 
plan for either family reunification or parental right termination.102 
The agency creates this plan by conducting additional hearings to  
 
 
 93. LYNN D. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF 
FAMILY LAW 608 (2d ed. 2006). 
 94. Id. 
 95. For example, Georgia uses a two-pronged approach. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-
11-94(a) (“In considering the termination of parental rights, the courts shall first determine 
whether [absent extreme circumstances] there is present and convincing evidence of parental 
misconduct or inability . . .  [and] whether termination . . . is in the best interest of the child”). 
 96. See, e.g., WARDLE & NOLAN, supra note 93, at 608; CHILD WELFARE 
INFORMATION GATEWAY, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/groundtermin.pdf. 
 97. SCOTT E. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS 121 (1992); see 
also CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY supra note 96, at 2. 
 98. FRIEDMAN, supra note 97, at 121. 
 99. ROBERT E. OLIPHANT & NANCY VER STEEGH, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: 
FAMILY LAW 459 (3d ed. 2010). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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decide whether the child should enter foster care, be returned to the 
parents, or placed in a specified institution.103 
This process can take an accelerated pace when an immediate and 
urgent need arises necessitating removal, such as when the child is in 
danger of imminent death, serious injury, or sexual abuse.104 When 
allegations of child abuse and neglect arise in emergency situations, 
states generally follow a three-pronged approach in determining 
whether immediate removal is appropriate.105 In this situation, the 
State is required to 1) demonstrate “proof of imminent danger,” 2) 
decide if nonremoval would be contrary to the child’s welfare, and 3) 
make reasonable efforts to prevent removal.106 
Despite state statutory variance, the United States Supreme 
Court and Congress have given general guidelines for states to 
follow for removal and termination actions. In Santosky v. Kramer, 
the Supreme Court declared the evidentiary standard applicable in 
these state actions.107 The Court held that before “completely and 
irrevocably” severing parental rights, due process requires a State to 
“support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.”108 
This elevated evidentiary standard requires asserted facts to have a 
high probability of being true109 and is most often applied when 
fundamental rights are at risk.110 However, it is left to state courts  
 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 459–60. 
 105. Jessica Dixon Weaver, The Principle of Subsidiarity Applied: Reforming the Legal 
Framework to Capture the Psychological Abuse of Children, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 247, 269 
(2011). 
 106. Id. 
 107. 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982). 
 108. Id. Clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate evidentiary standard, viewed as 
a higher hurdle than “preponderance of the evidence” but still a notch below the “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standard required for criminal convictions. See Addington v. Texas, 441 
U.S. 418, 424–25 (1979) (discussing the Court’s use of the three evidentiary standards and 
noting the distinct differences between them); see also Wilson v. Workman, 577 F.3d 1284, 
1298 (10th Cir. 2009) (highlighting the long history of the clear and convincing standard “as 
an intermediate burden of proof somewhere between ‘preponderance of the evidence’ and 
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’”) (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 424–25). 
 109. Lopinto v. Haines, 441 A.2d 151, 155–56 (Conn. 1981) (declaring the clear and 
convincing standard as requiring evidence that induces a “reasonable belief” in the trier that 
asserted facts “are highly probably true” and thus “substantially greater than the probability” 
of the facts being false). 
 110. Nilson, supra note 45, at 312 (citing In re Polk License Revocation, 449 A.2d 7, 13 
(N.J. 1982)). 
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and legislatures to make exact determinations of the burden 
surrounding this standard.111 
In addition to judicial evidentiary guidelines for removal 
procedures, Congress has also indirectly addressed this issue 
legislatively through the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act 
of 1980 (“AACWA”) and the Adoptions and Safe Families Act of 
1997 (“ASFA”).112 Although states have varying statutes dealing 
with termination of parental rights, Congress imposed additional 
rules on state child welfare systems through AACWA.113 AACWA’s 
aim was to reorient the focus of state removal actions from being the 
“first and last resort” toward a more service-first approach designed 
to emphasize maintaining functional and intact families.114 
The AACWA requires states to include specific elements for 
removal or termination actions and proceedings.115 States are 
obligated (while considering child safety as the paramount concern) 
to make “reasonable efforts” in preserving and reunifying families 
prior to removal and termination unless “aggravated circumstances” 
exist.116 According to the United States General Accounting Office, 
as of July 1999 all states had enacted laws that either mirrored 
federal legislation or imposed stricter requirements.117 Because of this 
 
 111. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769–70. 
 112. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 
500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Adoption and Safe Families Act 
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.).  
 113. See Stephanie Sherry, Note, When Jail Fails: Amending the ASFA to Reduce Its 
Negative Impact on Children of Incarcerated Parents, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 380, 382 (2010) 
(discussing the history and background leading up to the adoption of AACWA and its 
subsequent amendment through the ASFA). 
 114. Jeanne M. Kaiser, Finding a Reasonable Way to Enforce the Reasonable Efforts 
Requirement in Child Protection Cases, 7 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 100, 108 (2009).  
 115. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2006); see also Kaiser, supra note 114, at 107 n.23 (stating that 
AACWA’s ultimate intent was to reorient the foster care system to focus more on “services 
aimed at preserving families and achieving permanency for children” (quoting Will L. Crossley, 
Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State’s Burden Under Federal Child Protection 
Legislation, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 259, 270 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted))).  
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A–D) (2006). The term “aggravated circumstances” is left 
to be defined at the state level. In addition, the “reasonable efforts” requirement can also be 
precluded when “parental rights . . . to a [removed child’s] sibling have [previously] been 
terminated involuntarily.” Id. 
 117. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN SUBCOMM. ON 
HUMAN RES., COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FOSTER CARE: 
STATES’ EARLY EXPERIENCES IMPLEMENTING THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT 2 
(1999), available at http://tinyurl.com/6pcl6ms.  
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legislation, a majority of states require agencies to make reasonable 
efforts in family preservation before removal, and to attempt 
reasonable efforts in seeking reunification postremoval as a means of 
preventing need for removal oversight.118 
Although the “reasonable efforts” requirements potentially 
provide protection to religious parents in unwarranted and 
questionable removal situations, 42 U.S.C. § 671 of the AACWA 
does not define “reasonable efforts” and the federal government has 
evaded opportunities to provide clarification for the term beyond the 
current statutory context.119 Therefore, some scholars have displayed 
concern for the legislation’s “dead letter” status120 resulting from this 
lack of definition and the ASFA’s amendments failure “to provide 
states with a comprehensive meaning for and standards by which to 
measure reasonable efforts.”121 
However, religious parents and communities have assurances of 
basic statutory and judicial safeguards despite overarching 
occurrences at the YFZ Ranch.122 The clear and convincing 
evidentiary standard, and the federal legislative requirement for 
reasonable reunification efforts, can protect parental rights in 
religious contexts because they require both a high level of proof and 
significant agency efforts in restoring children to their families before 
parental rights can ultimately be terminated.123 
 
 118. Crossley, supra note 115, at 293 n.169.  
 119. Id. at 260.  
 120. Id. The term “dead letter” refers to the frequent disregard of the “reasonable 
efforts” requirement.   
 121. Id. at 290.  
 122. However, these potential safeguards would only be used in a defensive posture post-
removal and would not extend to civil actions prevented by “qualified immunity.” See Foy v. 
Holston, 94 F.3d 1528, 1534 (11th Cir. 1996) (describing the qualified immunity doctrine as 
having pragmatic impact “on the reality of the workaday world”). The qualified immunity 
doctrine allows public officials to act without fear of civil litigation only when they could have 
reasonably anticipated, before taking action, whether their conduct might expose them to 
damage liability. Id. In other words, an official receives immunity from civil damages if an 
objective observer would be unable to predict whether the action was completely lawful until 
adjudicated by a court in the future. Id. Thus, a religious parent who has a child unjustly 
removed based upon a belief system would potentially be without civil recourse, unless it could 
be shown that an objective observer in the agency’s position could anticipate the action’s 
potentially illegality. 
 123. Granted, this does not fully consider the implication for truly endangered children 
with neglectful parents in a nonreligious (or even religious) setting, but such is not within the 
consideration of this Comment. 
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C. “Removal Stampedes” 
Despite assurances of potential legal protection, it might remain 
unnerving to parents that a mass removal action (for arguably 
religious reasons) recently and actually took place within the United 
States at the YFZ Ranch. Even eventually vindicated religious parents 
may fear the interim effect removal might have on their children and 
the extreme efforts it takes to regain custody. Agencies should tread 
carefully out of consideration for harm to children caused by 
unnecessary removal efforts, which might be difficult for agencies 
practicing “defensive social work” by “erring on the side of safety” 
out of fear of adverse outcomes for the child.124 
Although many children were eventually returned to YFZ 
Ranch,125 arguably irreparable damage occurred during the interim 
proceedings by the mere act of removal.126 Disregarding due process 
and parental rights in removal actions not only brings up complex 
constitutional issues, but it also “jeopardize[s] children’s safety and 
well-being by increasing the likelihood that they will unnecessarily 
enter foster care” and potentially suffer irreparable harm from 
removal.127 Often forgotten during “removal stampedes . . . [are] the 
range and extent” of psychological, financial, and other harm on the 
affected families resulting from “unnecessary removals.”128 Removal 
actions can be extremely difficult for children suddenly forced to 
separate from familiar surroundings without possibly knowing or 
understanding why.129 
 
 124. Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency Removal in 
Child Protective Proceedings, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 457, 459 (2003) (citing Douglas J. Besharov, 
Protecting Abused and Neglected Children: Can Law Help Social Work?, 7 CHILD ABUSE & 
NEGLECT 421 (1983)); Colin Poitras, Rowland Fires a Rebuke at DCF, HARTFORD COURANT, 
May 21, 2003, at A1, available at http://tinyurl.com/6vfq7r8. 
 125. Authorities returned 438 children, most of who went back to the YFZ Ranch. Paul 
A. Anthony, Children’s Court Advocates Frustrated by CPS’ Actions, SAN ANGELO STANDARD-
TIMES (Mar. 29, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.gosanangelo.com/news/2009/mar/ 
29/childrens-court-advocates-frustrated-by-cps/.  
 126. See Chill, supra note 124, at 459 (arguing that potentially irreparable harm to the 
child occurs within “removal stampedes”). 
 127. See Sankaran, supra note 90, at 55 (noting that due process violations in juvenile 
courts have the potential to cause parents to disengage with the process altogether). 
 128. See Chill, supra note 124, at 459 (explaining that “[r]emoved children . . . are not 
necessarily safer in their new placement” and that unnecessary removals drain resources and 
intensify existing child protection challenges). 
 129. Id. at 457 (denoting potential terror and sorrow possibly resulting in attachment 
and abandonment issues in the child). 
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After an emergency child removal, a convergence of factors 
creates a “snowball effect,” making it difficult for parents to get the 
child back.130 From a practical standpoint, postremoval proceedings 
change the focus from “whether the child should be removed to 
whether he or she should be returned.”131 This requires parents to 
“demonstrate their fitness” for reunification, rather than requiring 
the State “to demonstrate the need for out-of-home placement.”132 
Seizing control of the child tilts the litigation playing field in favor of 
the State, shifting the burden of proof, “in effect, if not in law,” 
from the State to the parents.133 This prospectively slanted field 
presents another uneasy consideration for religious parents who may 
possess concerns regarding state removal actions. 
In summary, although safeguards for religious parents exist, 
future removal and termination actions will continue to involve an 
inherent tension between parental rights and state interests. These 
actions, and any potential solutions, will be determined on a 
situation-specific basis and will tend to address the same questions 
previously aligned on the rights and interests playing field. In 
addition, these actions may create irreparable harm to both child and 
parent before any potential arbitrary actions can be judicially 
rectified.  
IV. RELIGION AS A PRETEXT FOR REMOVAL AND TERMINATION 
A. Removal and Religion: Actual Abuse and Neglect Required 
In child custody hearings, the issue of religion primarily arises (if 
at all) within divorce proceedings;134 therefore, religious parents have 
been somewhat protected by the exclusion of religious 
considerations within the (nondivorce) removal and termination 
context. However, some argue that since courts can consider religion 
in child custody disputes without infringing a parent’s First 
Amendment rights, then courts may also consider religion in 
 
 130. Id. at 459; see also Pamela B. v. Ment, 709 A.2d 1089, 1093 (Conn. 1998) 
(recognizing “the potential impact . . . ex parte temporary custody order[s],” initial custody 
determinations, and continuity have on maintaining the status quo and thus influencing the 
final outcome in removal based custody determinations). 
 131. Chill, supra note 124, at 459.  
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Nilson, supra note 45, at 321. 
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parental termination proceedings without a First Amendment 
violation.135 But, religion generally remains a nonfactor in removal 
and termination measures except in instances of abuse, neglect, 
abandonment, or similar areas of parental action (or inaction) 
warranting child protection. The Supreme Court has upheld parents 
as having the dominant role in child-rearing decisions “absent a 
finding of neglect or abuse.”136 Nevertheless, the potential effect of 
religious belief resulting in child mistreatment can be a tremendous 
factor in a state’s removal justifications and also in determining 
continuation of parental rights.137 
Courts have determined that child custody decisions should 
focus on individual conduct and character rather than religious 
beliefs, unless the belief potentially jeopardizes a child’s health or 
safety.138 In Shepp v. Shepp, a Pennsylvania case involving a parent 
promoting polygamous beliefs to his child, the court held that the 
parent could be prohibited from advocating a sincere religious belief, 
“which, if acted upon, would constitute a crime.”139 According to 
the court, this exclusion only arises if it is established that advocating 
the conduct would have “potential for significant social burdens” or 
endanger the child’s physical or mental health or safety.140 Even 
then, the court reasoned that the conduct’s illegality was not 
sufficient on its own to warrant restriction.141 Therefore, a parent’s 
constitutional right to teach a religious belief to his or her child does 
not constitute a per se threat of harm and cannot be infringed absent 
 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979). 
 137. See In re Edward C., 178 Cal. Rptr. 694, 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (“[T]he state 
must show that the parent’s religious choices [actually] jeopardize the health or safety of the 
child and that the state cannot override parental choice just because it runs counter to the 
tastes or lifestyles of the majority. Mistreatment of a child, however, is not privileged because it 
is imposed in the guise of freedom of religious expression.”); see also Nilson, supra note 45, at 
322. 
 138. Shepp v. Shepp, 906 A.2d 1165, 1173–74 (Pa. 2006); see, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of 
Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1996) (recognizing the state’s compelling interest to protect 
a minor’s psychological and physical well-being); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233–34 
(1972) (holding that a parent’s free exercise rights may be limited if a parent’s decisions in 
relation to the belief could cause “significant social burdens” or might potentially jeopardize a 
child’s health or safety). 
 139. Shepp, 906 A.2d at 1173–74. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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a finding that discussing the belief comprises a grave threat to the 
child.142 
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court adopted a similar, albeit 
slightly different, position in In re Black.143 The court dealt with a 
child removal action involving a polygamous family.144 The court 
upheld the lower court’s finding that the children of the husband 
and his second wife were neglected (as defined by Utah statute) 
because their polygamous parents “knowingly failed . . . to 
provide . . . the proper maintenance, care, education and training 
required by law and morals.”145 The court reached this result due to 
the parents’ willful avoidance of abiding by the state’s bigamy 
laws.146 
Early in the opinion, the court focused on the couple teaching 
their children to live polygamy despite the law.147 Yet, the court 
ultimately seemed to distinguish between action as opposed to mere 
belief or teaching.148 The court declared that the parents not only 
believed and taught that plural marriage was God’s law, but they also 
actually exercised the “practice of polygamy in the presence of [the] 
children.”149 According to the court, merely advocating a belief in 
illegal activity is protected by the right to teach and believe religious 
doctrine “so long as it does not incite to crime.”150 Similar to Shepp, 
the Utah Supreme Court noted that had the parents merely accepted  
 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. 283 P.2d 887 (Utah 1955). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 907 (emphasis omitted). 
 146. Id. at 907–08 (detailing how the couple “embarked upon a criminal career” by not 
obtaining a marriage license and “for 20 years have had, a method convenient, easy, illegal and 
immoral”; or in other words, ignoring “every law established for the orderly behavior of decent 
people”). 
 147. Id. at 896 (discussing the husband’s admission that he taught, preached, and 
practiced polygamy and encouraged his children to do the same); see also id. at 869–99 
(detailing testimony from multiple family members on this same subject). 
 148. Id. at 901, 907. 
 149. Id. at 901. 
 150. Id. at 907 (qualifying this statement by declaring that such a right would not 
prevent the parents from falling within Utah’s child negligence statute because of the law’s 
specific requirement that a child be provided the care necessary for its “health, morals or well-
being”). But see Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (stating that if a religious belief 
were to become a crime, then teaching and advising its practice would be considered aiding 
and abetting and thus subject to criminal prosecution), abrogated on other grounds by Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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and affirmed polygamy as a matter of belief only, “they would 
probably not [have been] subject to a proceeding such as this.”151 
Hence, according to the Shepp and Black rationale, subscribing 
to and teaching a religious belief (even when implementing the belief 
may result in illegal conduct) does not warrant child removal and 
parental rights termination unless the belief actually results in illegal 
conduct or harm to the child.152 But it is uncertain whether this is a 
bona fide, albeit partial, protection to religious parents. For example, 
statutory discrimination153 could motivate a legislative body to pass a 
law directly (but not overtly) targeting a specific religious belief or 
practice, justified by the damage the tenant may cause to society’s 
“morals and good order.”154 If this were to happen, a now illegal 
religious practice could lead to immediate child removal and 
potential parental right termination, even if the law were found 
posttermination to be unconstitutional.  
The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah 
case provides a possible illustration.155 In Lukumi, a denomination of 
the Santeria religion attempted to conduct animal sacrifices.156 
Santerian doctrine includes the belief that animal sacrifices are a 
necessary part of its adherents’ faith and rites must be performed at 
significant life events, such as birth, marriage, and death.157 Because 
 
 151. Black, 283 P.2d at 901. 
 152. See id. But see Davis, 133 U.S. at 342 (stating that if a religious belief were to 
become a crime, then teaching and advising its practice would be considered aiding and 
abetting and thus subject to criminal prosecution). 
 153. Attempting to prove a government entity acted with discriminatory intent in a 
removal context might be problematic, in that “state officials can act lawfully even when 
motivated” by dislike or hostility toward specific protected behavior. Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 
1528, 1534 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)); see also Foy, 
94 F.3d at 1536 (holding that a child custody worker is entitled to immunity “unless it was 
already clearly established when [the worker] acted that no child custody worker could lawfully 
act—that is, do what [the worker] did—to protect children in the circumstances of this case if 
the worker also acted, in part, out of hostility toward the parent’s religion”). 
 154. See, e.g., United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 634 (1931) (Hughes, C.J. 
dissenting) (“The battle for religious liberty has been fought and won with respect to religious 
beliefs and practices, which are not in conflict with good order.”), overruled in part by 
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946); Davis, 133 U.S. at 342 (holding that religious 
actions cannot be contrary to peace, good order, and society’s morals); Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (declaring Congress’s ability to prohibit religious actions that 
violate social duties or subvert good order). 
 155. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 156. Id. at 525. 
 157. Id. 
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of concerns that a religious group may engage in practices 
inconsistent with “public morals, peace or safety,” the city council 
passed ordinances directly, but not explicitly, targeted towards 
outlawing Santerian animal sacrifices.158 The Supreme Court 
overturned the ordinances because city officials specifically designed 
the laws to suppress “the central element of the Santeria worship 
service.”159 Here, “religious practice [was] being singled out for 
discriminatory treatment” by broad ordinances forbidding religious 
worship that did not threaten a city’s legitimate interests in 
preventing animal cruelty.160 
Using Lukumi to explore a hypothetical example, it is possible 
that religious parents in a Lukumi-type situation could be viewed as 
negligent under a law similar to the Utah child negligence statute 
used in Black because they could potentially incite the children to 
engage in criminal conduct. Thus, the State could remove the 
children and terminate parental rights because the parents attempted 
to practice (or even teach) a currently illegal religious belief. Again, 
by way of illustration, parents in Lukumi would presumably have 
continued teaching the religious belief of sacrificing animals despite 
Florida passing a city ordinance making the practice against the law. 
In a Lukumi-type scenario under the Utah child negligence statute 
in Black, it is at least questionable whether parents would be allowed 
to teach, believe in, or practice this tenant without losing their 
children. In such a situation, it is also possible that all parents 
belonging to the Lukumi religious community could lose custody of 
their children if those parents were ascribed the greater community’s 
belief, despite a lack of evidence that they intended to practice the 
belief or encourage their children to do so (as happened at YFZ 
Ranch).161 
 
 158. Id. at 526. The city council enacted an emergency ordinance fully incorporating 
Florida’s existing animal cruelty laws, and then declared Hialeah city policy opposing ritual 
animal sacrifices. Id. at 527. In addition, the city council adopted ordinances defining 
“sacrifice” as harmful actions towards animals not accomplished “for the primary purpose of 
food consumption” and prohibited animal ownership for groups or individuals who perform 
animal sacrifices (even when intended for strictly food purposes), but exempted licensed 
slaughtering establishments. Id. at 527–28. The city also received confirmation from the 
Florida Attorney General that the ordinances would align with state law prohibiting religious 
animal sacrifice. Id. at 527. 
 159. Id. at 534–35. 
 160. Id. at 538. 
 161. One obvious, but noteworthy, distinction between this Lukumi illustration and the 
Shepp and Black cases is that the Court in Lukumi examined whether the animal sacrifice 
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Therefore, religious parents might still rationally fear a broad 
removal action if their ascribed belief potentially became unpopular, 
and thus against the law. As in Lukumi, it could be possible for a 
supposedly neutral law of general applicability to be passed against a 
religious practice that the majority believes to be against public 
health, safety, or morals. This could consequently subject religious 
parents to potential child removal actions for attempting to teach a 
prohibited practice, even if the law were later found posthearing to 
be unconstitutional. Or, in the case of YFZ Ranch, this could subject 
parents to removal and rights terminations for merely belonging to a 
religious group and living within the group’s community, whether or 
not the parents actually subscribed to the belief, planned on living it, 
or expected their children to potentially do so as well. 
Although Shepp and Black are only state cases with limited 
precedential value or influence, they potentially provide examples of 
protection religious parents can receive regarding teaching religious 
beliefs to their children, even when those beliefs directly (or 
indirectly) contravene statutory constructions. By relation, this 
would extend to fringe and nonmainstream beliefs because “religious 
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible 
to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”162 
In summary, courts seem to draw a line when the belief itself 
constitutes a grave threat of harm, potentially resulting from living 
the belief in the children’s presence. Yet, a potential challenge for 
religious parents may arise if a facially neutral law is passed targeting 
a sect’s religious practice under the guise of protecting public health, 
safety and morals; but, parents may possess a certain level of legal 
safety when teaching that religious belief to their children. However, 
this level of protection could be diminished when a government 
agency arbitrarily ascribes to parents the beliefs (and future actions 
regarding those beliefs) held by the religious community or sect they 
belong to. And a final difficulty is the question of how a particular 
court would construe the phrase “grave threat,” “harm,” or 
“neglect,” and what type of religious tenant might be perceived as 
potentially causing “significant social burdens,”163—especially 
 
prohibition was directly targeted toward the sect and not the impact of the sect’s teachings in a 
family environment. 
 162. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).  
 163. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233–34 (1972) for particular uses of “harm” 
and “significant social burdens.” Another question concerns a court’s role in construing such 
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considering that such ambiguity in a relevant state’s child welfare law 
is usually “resolved with reference to the public policy goals 
underlying” the statute.164 
B. Removal and Religion: Lessons from YFZ Ranch 
The YFZ Ranch case demonstrates that a state agency may view 
the possibility of a belief being possessed and potentially practiced at 
a future time (e.g., FLDS mothers encouraging their sons and 
daughters to “spiritually marry” at an early age) as creating grave 
harm to children, regardless of evidence that a particular parent 
personally taught the belief to their child. Such agency determination 
can be alarming to parents within a religious community who might 
be ascribed a belief involving illegal conduct with “potential” for the 
belief being lived at some future time.  
In the YFZ Ranch case, a pervasive religious belief system held by 
a “family” of believers was alleged to have risen to abusive levels 
based on current and future effects of perpetuating the belief, thus 
potentially placing all children in danger and creating an urgent need 
to remove the children from the community.165 Underage marriage 
constituted the abusive belief assumed to be held by the community 
that required immediate removal of all children.166 The sect’s 
“mindset” that young girls could marry at “whatever age” and that a 
female’s “highest blessing” is to have children created enough 
concern within DFPS to necessitate the immediate removal of all 
children in the community and displayed the agency’s apparent focus 
on the religious aspects of the community.167 Absent the belief 
regarding marriage, all of the children (other than five minors 
pregnant at the time of the raid168) probably would have remained at 
 
phrases. Are these questions of policy that should be left to the state legislatures that passed the 
law? See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 652 (1943) (Frankfurter, J. 
dissenting) (noting that although “conscientious scruples” override “religious scruples” when 
major state concerns are involved, judges should be diffident when setting their judgment 
against the state in the policy realm of differentiating between major and minor state concerns 
and in determining “what means are appropriate to proper ends”).  
 164. Sealed v. Sealed, 332 F.3d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 2003).  
 165. Affidavit, supra note 19, at 5–6. 
 166. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *2 (Tex. App. 2008) (as 
determined by DFPS in interviews with various community members). 
 167. Id. at *2.  
 168. See, e.g., TEX. DEP’T OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVS., ELDORADO 
INVESTIGATION: A REPORT FROM THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE 
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the ranch.169 However, viewing the belief as abuse necessitating 
removal required assuming the belief to be held by all parents within 
the community. It also required the inferential step that those 
parents would inevitably act on the belief either eventually or in the 
immediate future. It is doubtful whether state action upon such 
inferences could be justified given due process, clear and convincing 
evidentiary standards, and other removal considerations previously 
discussed.  
Protection of religious parents’ rights are enhanced by specific 
statutory and judicial safeguards, as exemplified by those afforded the 
YFZ parents who questioned the state’s assumptions and reasoning 
regarding their individual belief system. For example, DFPS’s actions 
in the case largely fell within the “immediate danger” and urgent 
need aspect of child removal.170 In these types of “immediate and 
urgent” actions, the Texas Family Code (“TFC”) requires DFPS to 
file suit regarding the parent-child relationship and request an initial 
hearing to be held no later than the first working day after 
removal.171 In addition, TFC requires a full adversarial hearing no 
later than fourteen days after the government agency takes 
possession of the child.172 These requirements demonstrate the 
previously discussed two-part process of statutory justification and 
plan creation173 essential to protecting parental rights. This is done 
by ensuring agency actions are immediately reviewed to determine 
whether requirements for removal were met and that a plan can be 
put forth for potential reunification. 
In addition, these statutory requirements place a presumption on 
reunification. Under the TFC, in an emergency removal situation, 
the agency must provide sufficient evidence to prove that: 1) the 
child’s physical health or safety was in danger, 2) there was an urgent 
need for protection requiring the child’s immediate removal, and 3) 
reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for 
removal, otherwise “the court shall order the return of the child to 
 
SERVICES 7 (2008) [hereinafter ELDORADO INVESTIGATION], available at http:// 
www.dfps.state.tx.us/documents/about/pdf/2008-12-22_Eldorado.pdf. 
 169. Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *4. 
 170. See, e.g., ELDORADO INVESTIGATION, supra note 168, at 7. 
 171. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.105(a) (West 2010). 
 172. Id. § 262.201(a). 
 173. See supra Part III. 
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the parent.”174 However, the Court of Appeals of Texas held that 
DFPS failed to carry its required statutory burden,175 and the court 
seemed to see through the religious pretext for the removal. The 
Supreme Court of Texas also affirmed the appellate court decision 
and held that “removal of the children was not warranted.”176  
The Texas Appellate Court examined DFPS’s actions within the 
context of each individual statutory prong. First, the court 
determined the FLDS belief system did not, itself, put the children in 
any physical danger.177 Second, the court held that DFPS failed to 
establish the need for urgent and immediate removal because of a 
lack of evidence that each child in the community was in immediate 
danger.178 The court debunked the notion that YFZ was a 
community household by citing a lack of evidence that the removed 
pregnant minors were living in the same household as the other 
children.179 In addition, there was no evidence the parents “may 
someday” allow future sexual abuse warranting the “extreme 
measure of immediate removal.”180 There was also no evidence 
FLDS mothers were likely to force their “pubescent female children 
to underage marriage or sex.”181 And, third, the court stated that 
DFPS did not make any reasonable efforts to ascertain if “some 
measure short of removal and/or separation from parents would 
have eliminated” the perceived risk.182 
This is significant for religious parents because the court implies 
that a belief system alone cannot place children in immediate physical 
danger, but rather it is the outcome from imposing “certain alleged 
tenets . . . on specific individuals” that may be brought into 
question.183 It is unlikely that a court or agency could justifiably 
predict that a parent will undoubtedly subject his or her child to a 
future underage marriage, or anything of a similar theological nature 
construed as a dangerous aspect of a particular parent’s religion. A 
 
 174. FAM. § 262.201(b)(1)–(3). 
 175. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3 (Tex. App. 2008). 
 176. In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Tex. 2008). 
 177. Steed, 2008 WL 2132014, at *3. 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. Witnesses stated that the community was actually divided into separate groups 
and households. Id. at *3 n.10. 
 180. Id. at *3. 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at *4.  
 183. Id. at *3.  
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court will likely determine that a mere teaching or belief does not 
incite removal when a state’s statutory requirements for removal 
include: 1) actual jeopardizing of health or safety, 2) high evidentiary 
standards regarding urgent need for immediate removal, and 3) 
reasonable agency efforts for reunification. In addition, if state 
statutes and judicial systems seemingly fail in protecting against 
potentially inequitable removal actions, religious parents have 
standing in federal courts to seek redress if they feel their parental 
rights have been violated by discriminate state action.184 
Thus, in custody cases involving state intervention, an important 
safeguard to religious parents and communities will be court actions 
similar to those in Texas where astute judges hold agencies strictly 
accountable to narrowly construed statutory requirements, which 
must be met independent of religious persuasion and organizational 
doctrine imputed to the believers in question. Rather, future 
adjudications may likely focus on individualized parental actions (or 
omissions) autonomously chosen and proven regardless of which 
church, sect, or religious community the parent belongs to. Such a 
direction will also prove more efficient for agencies similar to DFPS 
because they will not need to attempt to decipher religious 
requirements via postabduction interviews as a means of justifying 
previous removal actions.  
V. CONCLUSION: IS THE ONLY THING RELIGIOUS PARENTS HAVE 
TO FEAR IS FEAR ITSELF? 
Under the guise of child protection and state interests, DFPS 
removed virtually all children from the YFZ Ranch because the 
community was perceived to have a pervasive belief system that 
included underage marriage and sexual activity for minor females. 
DFPS considered the YFZ Ranch community to constitute one 
family unit and concluded that every parent of the community 
ascribed to the sect’s entire belief system. DFPS also assumed each 
FLDS community member would subscribe to, teach, and eventually 
practice underage marriage. The potential for practicing the belief 
system supposedly jeopardized each minor child within the YFZ 
Ranch because parental application of the belief would raise minor 
 
 184. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1525 
(11th Cir. 1993) (“Religious groups and their members that are signaled out for 
discriminatory government treatment . . . have standing to seek redress in federal courts.”). 
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females to be subjects of abuse, and boys would be raised to become 
perpetrators of sexual abuse. This threat purportedly created an 
immediate and urgent need, in the opinion of the DFPS, to abruptly 
remove all minor children from the community. Thus, male and 
female minors (including infants) were taken on the basis of 
potential, future adherence to a “pervasive belief system” ascribed to 
parents as members of a larger religious community. 
DFPS’s action potentially raises questions for other religious 
parents and communities regarding whether their children could also 
be removed, and their parental rights terminated, because of a 
pervasive religious belief they or their religious community hold. 
However, religious parents and communities generally should not 
fear broad future state removal and termination proceedings 
regarding their children unless there are larger issues of abuse, 
neglect, or abandonment surrounding religious beliefs. 
Typically, judicial and statutory protections will prevent removal 
and termination justifications based solely upon religious teaching or 
belief. For example, parents will be afforded due process because of 
the fundamental nature of parental rights in raising and teaching 
their children; any government action in this area must adhere to the 
“clear and convincing” evidentiary standard. Statutory provisions, 
such as those in the YFZ Ranch case, generally contain “reasonable 
effort” requirements in preserving and reunifying families. Courts, as 
demonstrated by the Texas Supreme and Appellate Court, will 
necessarily review justifications for regular and emergency removals, 
and also adjudicate proposed long-term plans for the child. Finally, 
teaching and belief will not warrant state intervention absent actual 
abuse or neglect. 
However, religious parents and communities should still 
maintain a reserved fear of government action regarding child 
removal and termination because of certain arbitrary elements 
remaining within the process. Despite parental due process rights, 
state action can still be statutorily and judicially justified when 
involving a child’s well-being or state interests in “public order.” 
Broad government agency and/or judicial interpretation of 
potentially subject terms like “welfare,” “abuse,” and “public order” 
could counteract and trump other parental protections and 
considerations extending beyond typical scenarios.185 For example, in 
 
 185. See Mark R. Brown, Rescuing Children from Abusive Parents: The Constitutional 
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the YFZ Ranch case, DFPS removed children in danger of abuse 
despite lack of confirming evidence that abuse had taken place, or 
that potential for abuse was present. As it turned out, the initial call 
accusing a community member of abuse was a hoax.186 Had the 
Texas statutory scheme or judicial decrees viewed “abuse” and 
“welfare” as broadly as DFPS, the outcome may have warranted full-
fledged fear for religious parents and communities everywhere. To 
help remedy broad statutory readings bringing about this possible 
outcome in the future, ambiguous terminology in child removal 
statutes should be refined and enhanced.187 
In addition, broad statutory interpretation, direct statutory 
discrimination, or a hostile view of a particular belief system, might 
jeopardize perceived parental protections currently in existence. Even 
the statutory requirement for reasonable agency efforts in preserving 
and reunifying families may be trumped by perceived “aggravating 
circumstances” viewed by governing, administrative, and judicial 
bodies as negating the possibility for reunification. “Aggravating 
circumstances,” unless specifically defined, can be a subjective phrase 
open to interpretation that is hostile to religious parents associated 
with fringe, or even mainstream, communities. This is compounded 
by some state action shifting the statutory balance from “aggravating 
circumstances” toward a more harm-centered approach and the 
arguably dead-letter status of the reasonable efforts clause. 
And finally, fear of removal for religious reasons might still be 
justified by the fact that such an occurrence as the YFZ Ranch case 
actually and recently happened. Although many children were 
eventually returned to their parents and homes on the Ranch, 
removal arguably caused irreparable social and mental harm during 
interim proceedings after the children were forcibly taken. 
Although safeguards for religious parents exist, future removal 
and termination cases involving the tension between parental rights 
and state interests also contain potential pitfalls that may create 
justified (albeit reserved) fear in the minds of religious parents and 
 
Value of Pre-Deprivation Process, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 913, 960 (2004) (“Dependency laws . . . 
uniformly rely on ambiguous criteria, like ‘abuse’ and ‘neglect,’ without providing true 
guidance to social workers and welfare agencies.”). 
 186. Teague, supra note 20 (the caller was considered a real person in the investigation 
up until May 18, 2008, at which point authorities acknowledged she did not exist). 
 187. See Howard Davidson, Child Protection Policy and Practice at Century’s End, 33 
FAM. L.Q. 765, 774 (1999) (asserting that “it is time to seriously consider changes in the 
fundamental ways in which child abuse and neglect are defined and responded to”). 
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communities within the United States. As the Court stated in United 
States v. Ballard, “If one could be sent to jail because a jury in a 
hostile environment found [that person’s religious] teachings false, 
little indeed would be left of religious freedom.”188 Similarly, a 
religious parent might state, “If one could have their children 
removed because a city, state, or agency in a hostile environment 
found the parent’s religious teachings against health, safety, or public 
order, little indeed may be left of religious freedom and parental 
rights.” 




 188. 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944). 
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